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How Does a Dark Room Appear: 
Husserl’s Illumination of the Breakthrough of Logical Investigations 
 





Evidence is the very core of Husserlian phenomenology, with the term “evidence” signifying for 
Husserl the phenomenological perspective on the question of truth. In contrast to the conventional 
philosophical understanding of “truth” in mainly epistemological terms, Husserl’s notion of 
“evidence”, as elaborated in his Logical Investigations (1900–1), is more essentially ontological, 
pointing to the way in which a phenomenon becomes clear to us in its constitution. Husserl’s main 
point in the Sixth Investigation was that we can “see” how evidence functions when we compare 
something in the fullness of its presence with the emptiness of its absence. This paper considers 
the example Husserl offers of the room where the lights go off in order to illuminate the 
breakthrough for phenomenology achieved by Logical Investigations in its move beyond logic and 




Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900–1) 
was the breakthrough of phenomenology (HuaVI/169; 
HuaIX/§3; HuaXX(1)/293; HuaXXXV/373). The 
work was heralded both as a sensation (Stein, 1965/ 
1987, p. 174) and as a shock (Levinas, 1949/1988, p. 
115), and Wilhelm Dilthey even compared it to 
Kant’s first critique (Heidegger, 1925/1979, p. 30).  
 
What was this breakthrough? One could argue that 
the weightiest sentences in Husserl’s publications 
after Investigations are the principle of all principles 
(Ideas I, §24) and the first methodological principle 
(Cartesian Meditations, §5). The principle of the 
Cartesian Meditations is sometimes called the 
principle of evidence, but actually the principle from 
Ideas might equally well be termed as such. Both 
principles state that evidence is the very core of 
Husserlian phenomenology. This suggests that a new 
view on evidence or truth also constitutes the 
breakthrough of Investigations, and the principles do 
indeed give us a viewpoint on Husserl’s ground-
breaking work. Husserl’s main point in the Sixth 
Investigation was that we can “see” how evidence 
functions as we compare something in the fullness of 
its presence and in the emptiness of its absence.  
 
Now, in the wake of the centennial celebrations, 
Investigations has again drawn the attention of the 
philosophical world. Seminars have been arranged 
and new collections of commentaries published 
(Dahlström, 2003; Zahavi & Stjernfelt, 2002). Yet, 
perhaps the most important event is the publication - 
after a long wait - of the first supplementary volume 
to Investigations in Husserliana. This volume, Vol. 
20/1 (Melle, 2002), contains Husserl’s (1913) draft 
for the revision of the Sixth Investigation and for a 
preface to the new edition of Logical Investigations. 
 
Husserl was very reluctant to return to his earlier 
works (HuaV/147-148; HuaVI/185; HuaDIII(6)/281; 
Fink, 1976a, p. 280; Landgrebe, 1988). When he did, 
there was always the danger that the work would turn 
into something else. When working on the second 
edition of Investigations, Husserl himself worried that 
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this might happen to this work as well (HuaDI/171). 
He managed, however, to complete the second edition 
of the Prolegomena and the first five Investigations. 
There were changes, but the work did not turn into a 
“völlig neues Werk”, as Husserl had been afraid it 
might. Perhaps the biggest change was that the words 
phenomenologisch and reell were no longer used 
synonymously. Yet, there was still the Sixth 
Investigation to be prepared for the second edition. 
 
What is there in Investigations that breaks through 
into a new line of thinking? The pivotal point of the 
work is its consideration of truth or evidence (Fink, 
1966a; Tugendhat, 1967, p. 21). Martin Heidegger 
writes: 
 
This elaboration of evidence was for the 
first time brought to a successful resolution 
by Husserl, who thus made an essential 
advance beyond all the obscurities 
prevalent in the tradition of logic and 
epistemology. (1925/1979, §9) 
 
Husserl breaks through in his elaboration of evidence, 
and that is done in the Sixth Investigation: Elements 
of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge (cf. 
Øverenget, 1996). For Husserl, the term “evidence” 
signifies the phenomenological approach to the 
question of truth. It is not a solution to this question 
of philosophical questions, but, within Husserliana, 
“evidence” gathers together Husserl’s view on how 
this question should be dealt with. Normally in 
philosophical terminology we understand the concept 
“truth” mainly in terms of epistemology. In contrast 
to this, Husserl’s “evidence” can equally well be read 
as an ontological concept: it tries to point out how 
something becomes clear to us in its constitution. 
(Actually Husserl mainly uses epistemological terms 
in order to explicate truth, whereas Heidegger prefers 
ontological concepts.) 
 
At the outset, however, Husserl’s radicality is not 
obvious. He seems to advocate a version of the 
correspondence theory of truth, and his main concern 
seems to be to investigate how meaning-intention 
corresponds to that which is meant. Nevertheless, 
Husserl himself saw that he had achieved something 
more radical than that. He also saw that his 
commentators did not realise how earth-shattering his 
work was (HuaDIII(6)/281, 286; HuaDIII(4)/85). For 
Husserl, phenomenology is essentially and 
necessarily radical (Mertens, 1996). In order to 
understand the breakthrough, we should try to reach 
this fundamental or even extreme aspect of Husserl’s 
thought. 
 
Radicality means that we reach for the roots (radix) or 
origin of something. Richard Campbell writes: 
 
A theory about any topic presupposes some 
prior understanding of it, a preunder-
standing which is implicit in the ‘problem’ 
posed, and with which the theory is 
designed to deal, so is it with all these 
theories of truth. (Campbell, 2001, p. 344) 
   
Husserl’s aim in Investigations is to reach the level 
that precedes the discussion between theories of truth  
-  for example, the dispute between coherence theory 
and correspondence theory. The phenomenological 
point of view is explicated at the original level where 
theoretical critique is not yet valid (Mertens, 1996, p. 
130). It has also been argued that a theory of evidence 
is impossible (Kulenkampff, 1973; cf. Mertens, 1996, 
p. 119n) and would constitute a vicious circle which 
presupposes that which it is supposed to investigate. 
Within the phenomenological approach, one “does 
not engage in theory” (Husserl, 1907/1999, p. 46; 
HuaII/58). From this point of view, we can also 
understand Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is the 
only concrete science: “though analysis proceeds by 
abstraction, still the concrete whole is always before 
the phenomenologist” (Cairns, 1976, pp. 46, 51; 
HuaV/152). From the phenomenological point of 
view, you can begin to consider the truth of any given 
whatsoever if you only manage to find the difference 
between its presence and absence. And, as one does 
not necessarily need to know what Kant, for example, 
wrote about this given something, it is really possible 
to turn away from theories and look to the things 
themselves. This also suggests that, in order to be 
faithful to Husserl’s insight, we should not read 
Investigations as part of the discussion between 
different theories. But what can we do instead? 
 
In one of his recently published manuscripts, “Kritik 
der cartesianische Epoché” (1933), Husserl states that 
philosophy after Descartes [der ganzen Neuzeit] lacks 
the view on evidence as the kind of action [Leistung] 
where what is meant is brought to original self-
givenness. Instead, modern philosophy understands 
evidence as apodictic evidence. Truth is understood in 
relation to certainty or indubitability. Husserl 
acknowledges the importance of apodictic evidence 
and, in his attempt to turn phenomenology into a first 
philosophy in the 1920s, he even sometimes gives 
priority to apodicticity over adequacy (Himanka, 
2005b). Yet, in order to see the full radicality of 
Husserl’s original view on evidence, we should take 
seriously an earlier (1907) remark where he states that 
it is fundamental that evidence “signifies nothing 
other than adequate self-givenness” (Husserl, 1907/ 
1999, p. 44; HuaII/59; my emphasis). It is easier to 
see the connection to other philosophical approaches 
when we take apodicticity or certainty into account. 
Yet, in order to see the radicality and originality of 
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Husserl’s account, we should restrict ourselves to 
adequate self-givenness. How are we to understand 
this self-givenness? (Himanka, 2005b.) 
 
When Husserl characterises his view on evidence in 
his work towards the second edition of the Sixth 
Investigation, he notices that he has already outlined a 
view on fulfilment in his article, “Psychological 
Studies in the Elements of Logic”, published in 1894. 
In it, Husserl writes about the “experience of the fact 
that the intuited is also the intended shall be 
designated as consciousness of the fulfilled intention” 
(Husserl, 1894/1994, p. 156; HuaXXII/109). At that 
time, Husserl was working with the basic problems of 
arithmetic, and numbers are a good example of 
Husserl’s view of evidence.  
 
In order to see evidence as fulfilment, we need to 
compare empty and full intentions. The intention of a 
number - say five - is fulfilled as I count to five: on 
the table there is a pencil (1), a telephone (2), a book 
(3), a cup (4) and a computer (5). As a result of 
counting, the number five is present to me. There are 
several ways for a number to be absent; J. Philip 
Miller (1982, p. 69) finds at least six senses in which 
we can speak of the absence of number. Let us take 
one example from Miller’s exposition: 
 
Suppose I emptily intend the number of 
apples in the bowl. I name the number - 
either by saying that there are ‘four’, or at 
least by asking just ‘how many’ there are - 
even though the apples themselves are not 
sensuously present. In such a case I intend 
a number, a determinate multitude, in its 
absence. (p. 67) 
 
After that I might seek to bring this intention to 
fulfilment and count the apples in their sensuous 
presence. In this process, it might turn out that there is 
only one apple or even none. Miller continues: 
 
There is not a ‘number’ of apples after all; 
the apples do not in fact make a multitude 
as I have anticipated. The ‘one’ or the 
‘none’ that is now present to me is present 
precisely as a lack or ‘privation’ of 
number.  
 
In this kind of process where we consider numbers as 
empty and fulfilled intentions, in absence and in 
presence, we see how a number is constituted or what 
makes a number a number. This is how the idea of 
evidence or truth in the phenomenological sense came 
to Husserl  -  and this is still perhaps the best example 
for any one of us to learn to recognise it. 
 
Afterwards Husserl saw his early view on fulfilment 
as incomplete (HuaXX(1)/107n) and situated the real 
breakthrough in Investigations (HuaVI/169n-170n). 
What was lacking? According to Husserl’s principle 
of principles, phenomenology aims to apprehend 
reality at the level where that which is studied is 
given to us in an original way (HuaIII/§24). A 
number is indeed given in an original way when it 
comes from absence to presence - but does this 
already suppose something more primitively given? 
 
Section 18 of the Sixth Investigation considers the 
concept (5^3)^4. A number presented here “arises 
when one forms the product 5^3 x 5^3 x 5 ^3 x 5^3”. 
From this we can go further to the sense of 5^3, i.e., 
to the formation of 5 x 5 x 5. Going further back from 
here, we “should have to clarify 5 through the 
definitory chain 5 = 4 + 1, 4 = 3 + 1, 3 = 2 + 1, 2 = 1 
+ 1”. Here we move from a more complicated and 
advanced level of the concept (5^3)^4 to a primitive 
and reduced level of counting 1 + 1. Have we thus 
reached the first level of constitution? 
 
There is an even more primitive level of constitution 
that is supposed when we start to count: the things 
that we count must first be seen as things. The act of 
counting is “inevitably founded on a lower level act 
of sensuous intuition” (Miller, 1982, p. 66). The 
problem, then, is: how are we to explicate this 
pretheoretical level of sensuous intuition? At this 
level, one cannot argue much more than that evidence 
is evidence for evidence. In order to convince others, 
one has to turn from argumentation to demonstration 
and illustrative examples. 
 
When we turn from the philosophy of arithmetic to 
the breakthrough of phenomenology in Investigations, 
we feel the need for a good example of fulfilment at 
this basic level of sensuous intuition (Anshauung). In 
his lectures on Investigations, Heidegger (1925/1979) 
takes a nearby bridge as an example: 
 
I can now envisage the Weidenhauser 
bridge; I place myself before it, as it were. 
Thus the bridge is itself given. I intend the 
bridge itself and not an image of it, no 
fantasy, but it itself. (p. 41) 
 
The main point in this is that even the envisaged 
bridge is given as itself and not as a representation. 
As I envisage the bridge, there is no representation 
present, and to suppose such an entity would mean a 
“theory without phenomenology”. Such a theory 
would violate the phenomenological principle 
(HuaI/§5; HuaIII/§24). Now the bridge is given as 
itself: “And yet it is not bodily [leibhaftig] given to 
me. It would be if I went down the hill and placed 
myself before the bridge itself.” The bridge in its 
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bodily presence is given more fully than a merely 
envisaged bridge. Heidegger then goes on to explain 
empty intending [leermeinen] and turns to language: 
 
Empty intending is the mode of 
representing [Art des Vorstellens] 
something in the manner of thinking about 
something or recalling it, which for 
example can take place in a conversation 
about the bridge. (p. 41) 
 
I might say to someone, “Meet me on the bridge 
tomorrow morning at 9 a.m.”. Heidegger has this kind 
of ordinary talk in mind when he explicates further:  
 
A large part of our ordinary talk goes on in 
this way. We mean matters themselves and 
not images or representations of them, yet 
we do not have them intuitively given. In 
empty intending, too, the intended is itself 
directly and simply intended, but merely 
emptily, which means without any intuitive 
fulfilment. (p. 41)  
 
Somehow we can see the difference between empty 
and fulfilled at the basic level of sensuous intuition. 
Yet, Heidegger’s example is problematic in the same 
way as was the example of numbers. In his 
exposition, Heidegger turns to a more advanced level 
of constitution than mere sensuous intuition. Empty 
intention is exemplified in our use of language, and 
not within the horizons of the primitive and 
immediate level of sensuous intuition. 
 
Husserl’s radical approach to truth does not start from 
correct sentences, and he did not even valuate correct 
sentences as such (HuaV/96). This does not, of 
course, mean that correct sentences are not of central 
interest for philosophy. Instead, Husserl means that, 
in order to study their correctness, we must first turn 
to a more fundamental level of experience (Husserl, 
1939/1985, §10). From the phenomenological 
perspective, it is clear that language is not a direct 
description of experience (Luft, 2002, p. 275). Yet, 
the emphasis on experience instead of proposition is 
not enough to explain the breakthrough of 
Investigations. 
 
What we need, in order to show what Husserl means 
by evidence, is an example of the difference between 
empty and fulfilled that takes place at the sensuous 
level of intuition without reference to the higher 
levels of constitution. Perhaps the best attempt to 
illustrate this in Husserliana is the experience of the 
dark room. 
 
Husserl does not present a definition of truth in order 
to defend it by arguments: he tries instead to show 
how truth appears at the primary level. In this kind of 
approach, examples are the key. It is through 
following and repeating examples that we may learn 
to see how Husserl understands truth. There are 
examples - apple tree, paper, sound, and so forth - in 
Logical Investigations. Husserl also exemplifies 
intentions that cannot be fulfilled, such as 
contradictions. Yet, the problem is to explicate an 
empty appearance at the level of sensuous intuition. 
This is crucial, because, from the point of view of 
Husserlian phenomenology, other possibilities of 
givenness already suppose these more primitive 
modes of constitution.  
 
Work on the second edition of the Sixth Investigation 
was very difficult for Husserl. In a letter to Johannes 
Daubert, he confesses that he has reached the limit of 
his powers (HuaDI/182). From our point of view, one 
of the main difficulties was how to present an 
example of the difference between empty and full at 
the primary level of sensuous intuition. Husserl 
attempts this in Section 19: “Die ‘Leermodifikation’ 
als allgemeine Bewußtseinsmodifikation”. In this 
attempt, Husserl turns from a fulfilled to an empty 
intention and does not start from symbols or signs. 
Husserl writes: 
 
The lights in the room went off. The 
environment that was there is still there and 
not only as something that was there (as 
remembered), but as really present 
(gegenwärtige) - and it stays there in a 
completely (völlig) empty way. (§19; my 
translation) 
 
Husserl claims that, in the room where the lights have 
gone off, the environment is still present to me in a 
way that cannot be limited to my recollection of the 
room with the lights on.  
 
The difficulty in the phenomenological approach is 
how to see the direct way reality appears. In this 
example, the difficulty emerges in our memory. Is the 
dark room given only through memory or is it given 
directly as well, as being there now, as Husserl 
claims? He elaborates this way of appearing further: 
 
The things no longer “appear” in the 
authentic sense (eigentlichen Sinn); they 
are not there intuitively (intuitive) in their 
bodily self (leibhaften Selbstheit); they are 
there exactly in the same manner as they 
appeared before, from a certain side and 
with certain adumbrations (Abschattungen) 
and so on. There is consciousness of them, 
but the whole phenomenon is transformed 
into emptiness. Things are “there”, in a 
manner of speaking, in bodily emptiness 
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(in leerer Leibhaftigkeit), as a modification 
of bodily [presence]. (HuaXX(1)/97; my 
translation) 
 
For Husserl, bodily presence is a superior way of 
being given. In this example, Husserl then ventures to 
say that in a way (sozusagen) there is also the 
possibility for empty bodily appearance. Is there? 
Does the dark environment appear “in person” 
(leibhaft) but in an empty way? If so, we would have 
the illustration we were looking for. 
 
Husserl emphasised that readers should not just 
accept what he has written, but should think these 
thoughts through themselves. In order to really 
understand the thinking of another, we ourselves 
should think and not just follow the other’s train of 
thought (HuaXXVII/217). In this case, we should 
experience the example. 
 
When the lights go off, the appearance of my 
environment changes. I no longer see the things, but I 
do sense that I am in a room or space: there is 
something around me. This space is present to me at 
least as possibilities: I could, for instance, take a step 
on the floor. At least partly, these possibilities rely on 
my memories of the room. The difficulty is to see 
whether the environment is also given directly, 
without the help of memory. The task is difficult 
because my history - whether in darkness or in light - 
always determines the things I now see. As I wonder 
about this, however, I notice that I actually do sense 
the environment: I sense the floor under my feet. 
Even when there is no sound or smell, the 
environment is not given in a completely empty way  
- I always sense it through my body. Darkness does 
not separate me from my environment. 
 
In the darkness I also taste something in my mouth. 
Even if I do not have gum or food, for example, in my 
mouth, I still in a way taste my spittle. I also feel my 
tooth and my tongue and I feel the air as I inhale. Yet, 
here it is difficult to say where my body’s borders end 
and the environment starts. 
 
Husserl’s example is a room which in the darkness 
turns into an environment. We can suppose that there 
is no wind in the room. Yet there is no mention of the 
status of my body: am I staying still or moving? If I 
wave my hands in the air, I feel the air against my 
skin and sense the environment. Actually, I sense this 
more clearly when it is dark. 
 
Although Husserl takes all bodily senses seriously 
and considers the many ways of sensing one’s 
environment, there is a strong emphasis on seeing. In 
the lectures on the Idea of Phenomenology, for 
example, Husserl writes about phenomenology that 
“[I]t does all this in the act of pure seeing… . The 
procedure of seeing and ideating within the strictest 
phenomenological reduction is its exclusive domain” 
(Husserl, 1907/1999, p. 43). Although one must 
understand seeing (schauen) here in the widest 
possible sense, Husserl’s traditional concentration on 
seeing is a biased starting point. Does this problem 
harm the main point of the example, the 
demonstration of empty givenness? 
 
The advantage of Husserl’s example is that it tries to 
situate the empty givenness at the very primordial 
level of sensing our environment. The problem with 
the example is how to be able to purify it in two 
respects: on the one hand, into pure seeing, and, on 
the other, so that it excludes my memories or 
background. Ultimately, this latter aspect would take 
us to the problem of history. 
 
Phenomenology aims “to disclose reality … as it 
shows itself before scientific inquiry”; it aims to 
provide a foundation for the sciences from 
pretheoretical experience (Heidegger, 1925/1979, p. 
2). In this sense, phenomenology is primitive 
(Himanka, 2005a). With his example of the room 
where the lights go off, Husserl ventures to turn to 
this primitive level. The example illustrates the 
difference between fulfilled (presence) and empty 
(absence), which is at the very core of the 
phenomenological view on the reality of the real. It is 
clear that Husserl’s approach to viewing the 
difference between presence and absence explicates 
how beings are for us: numbers come to being in 
counting. Yet, as phenomenology aims to be a strenge 
Wissenschaft, to cover all that appears (HuaI/37; 
HuaV/139, 159; HuaXVII/227; Hua XXV/3; 
HuaXXIX/12), one has to explore whether this 
approach is limited. In particular, one has to 
investigate whether the view on truth functions at the 
levels supposed by the higher forms of constitution. 
With the case of the dark room, Husserl exemplifies 
the phenomenological view at the very elementary 
level of sensuous intuition. Although this illustration 
turned out to be highly problematic, it also succeeds 
in showing a difference in fullness at this elementary 
level. The example shows us how the 
phenomenological approach functions at the 
elementary level of sensuous intuition. At the same 
time, Husserl’s example is so simple that it almost 
seems trivial. Yet, according to Husserl, it is the 
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